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Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western 
Europe 
 




Despite Western Europe’s extensive history of right-wing terrorism, a systematic 
categorization of key actors and events is lacking. This article aims to narrow this gap by 
proposing the first empirically derived typology of right-wing terrorism and violence in 
Western Europe. The article begins by introducing a method for reviewing and developing 
typologies, informed by relevant social science literature. This method is first used to review 
Ehud Sprinzak’s seminal typology of right-wing terrorism. While Sprinzak merits 
recognition for having developed the only universal typology in the field, the review shows 
that his typology does not satisfy established criteria for typology building. Combining 
quantitative and qualitative post-WWII data, a new typology is therefore proposed, based 
on attack frequencies and differences in perpetrators’ strategy and organization. This new 
typology facilitates sharper distinctions, both between different types of perpetrators and 
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Introduction 
Having attracted relatively little attention for some time, right-wing terrorism 
returned to Western Europe's public eye in 2011 with the terrorist attacks in Norway and 
the disclosure of the German terrorist cell Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU). To 
determine whether these were isolated events or signal a revival of right-wing terrorism in 
Western Europe it is helpful to (1) identify and explore past waves of right-wing terrorism 
and violence in this region and (2) categorize and compare the most important events and 
actors involved. Such comparative studies of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western 
Europe have so far been rare. In particular, no systematic categorization of key events and 
actors exists. Aiming to narrow this gap, this article proposes a typology of right-wing 
terrorism and violence, specifically tailored to the case of Western Europe. 
Becoming increasingly popular in the study of terrorism and political violence, 
typologies constitute a particularly useful analytical tool for categorizing data, comparing 
cases, and developing theory (Ganor, 2008; Marsden, 2014; Marsden & Schmid, 2011). 
However, to boost a typology’s theoretical utility, certain criteria must be met (Bailey, 1994; 
Collier, LaPorte, & Seawright, 2012; Doty & Glick, 1994; Elman, 2005; George & Bennett, 
2005; McKinney, 1966). Ehud Sprinzak’s (1995) seminal typology of right-wing terrorism 
remains to date the only universal typology in the field, and is the most frequently cited 
publication on right-wing terrorism more generally.2 Its strength lies in being based on an 
explicit theory of how right-wing activists become terrorists – the theory of split 
delegitimization. However, as this article argues, this theory builds on vague concepts, shaky 
assumptions about right-wing activists, and empirical inaccuracies concerning past terrorist 
attacks. Moreover, it remains unclear exactly how Sprinzak derived his types from his 
theory, and his typology includes types that are not mutually exclusive. In short, Sprinzak’s 
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typology does not satisfy established criteria for typology building. An alternative typology 
of right-wing terrorism is therefore needed.   
Combining quantitative and qualitative post-WWII data, this article proposes the 
first empirically derived typology of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe.3 
Western Europe was chosen because this region arguably has the world’s most extensive 
history of right-wing terrorism – yet a categorization of such events does not exist. 
Furthermore, while most right-wing terrorists share some common characteristics, there are 
important regional dynamics that must be taken into consideration to fully understand why 
terrorism occurs at a given time and place.4 Accordingly, relevant typologies have been 
developed for regions such as North America (Kaplan, 1995; Perliger, 2012) and Russia 
(Laryš & Mareš, 2011), but not for Western Europe. Finally, existing databases on West 
European terrorism (Engene, 2004, 2007) enables the construction of an empirically 
derived typology for this region. Unfortunately, similar data is unavailable for Europe as a 
whole.  
The article contributes in four ways: First, it provides a comparative analysis of key 
right-wing terrorists in Western Europe and their different paths towards terrorism. 
Notably, this analysis suggests that despite recent terrorist incidents, the threat from 
organized right-wing terrorism to West European citizens is likely significantly lower today 
than some 20 to 30 years ago.5 At the same time, reliable and updated data on more loosely 
                                                 
3
 Sarah V. Marsden (2014) makes a convincing case for the utility of empirically derived typologies in the study of 
terrorism and political violence. 
4
 For example, Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2003, pp. 399–436) argues in his extensive review of the literature on right-wing 
violence that there are substantial differences between the American, East European, and West European contexts. 
5
 This claim is supported by findings from a forthcoming study by this author documenting and analysing about 500 
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organized forms of right-wing terrorism and violence is lacking, and more research is needed 
to document recent developments.6  
Second, the article introduces a practical method for reviewing and developing 
typologies, informed by relevant social science literature. The method applies not only to 
studying terrorism and political violence; indeed it can be used to develop and review 
typologies in any social science field. 
Third, by emphasizing differences in perpetrators’ strategy and organization, the 
proposed typology offers sharper distinctions – both between different types of perpetrators 
and between different forms of violence – than typologies based primarily on ideological 
differences.7  
Finally, the typology offers a new contribution to the relatively small literature on 
right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe. While the comparative literature on 
European radical right parties and movements has grown steadily, the comparative 
literature on right-wing terrorism and violence in Europe peaked during the 1990s, but then 
largely stagnated (key examples include Bjørgo, 1995, 1997; Bjørgo & Witte, 1993; 
Hoffman, 1982; Koopmans, 1996; Pedahzur, 2001). This article seeks to contribute to an 
ongoing and much needed revitalization of this field of study (see e.g. Backes & Moreau, 
2012; Caiani, Porta, & Wagemann, 2012; Taylor, Holbrook, & Currie, 2013). 
The article starts by introducing five criteria that good typologies should satisfy. 
Next, these criteria are used to conduct a detailed review of Sprinzak’s typology. Finally, the 
criteria are applied to develop a new typology of right-wing terrorism and violence, 
specifically tailored to the case of Western Europe.  
                                                 
6
 A commendable contribution is in this regard Daniel Köhler’s (2014a) recent study of German right-wing terrorism. 
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A Practical Method for Developing and Reviewing Typologies 
A typology’s scientific merit rests on the methods used to construct it and on its 
creator’s ability to communicate these methods to the reader. From a broad reading of 
relevant social science literature, five criteria that good typologies should satisfy emerge:8  
1. Clearly define the overarching concept of the typology 
2. Specify whether the typology is descriptive or explanatory  
3. Describe in detail how the types are (inductively and/or deductively) constructed 
4. Propose an intuitive model or matrix of the typology 
5. Consider a simpler solution with mutually exclusive types 
These five criteria can also be seen as sequential tasks. While task one, three and four 
are intuitive and straightforward, task two and five may require some further elaboration.   
Although typologies serve various functions, scholars seem to agree that two main 
categories of typologies exit: First, descriptive typologies characterize variants of a 
phenomenon. Routinely being used to organize data and compare cases, they offer a 
simplified yet systematic and analytically useful depiction of a phenomenon’s subtypes and 
the characteristics distinguishing them.  
Second, explanatory typologies, also known as typological theories help scholars test 
or develop theory. They “seek to identify the various causal mechanisms and pathways that 
link the independent variables of each ‘type’, or cell in a typology, with its outcome”(George 
& Bennett, 2005, p. 234).  
                                                 
8
 My method of enquiry was the following: I identified frequently cited publications on typologies in quality social 
science journals over the past 20 years, in addition to authoritative books (Bailey, 1994; Collier, LaPorte, & Seawright, 
2012; Doty & Glick, 1994; Elman, 2005; George & Bennett, 2005; McKinney, 1966). Next, I developed a list of 
criteria that good typologies should satisfy according to this literature. Finally, I eliminated criteria considered as too 
ambitious, such as the criterion of exhaustiveness, which requires knowledge about the entire empirical universe, and 
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A couple of examples may be helpful here: In Politics (ND), Aristotle introduced 
one of the first typologies of political systems (Table 1):  
TABLE 1 
ARISTOTLE’S TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
 Form 
Number of ruler(s) Normal Perverted 
One  Monarchy Tyranny 
Few  Aristocracy Oligarchy 
Many  Polity Democracy 
 
Aristotle’s typology is descriptive because its constitutive variables do not follow 
from any explicit theory about how political systems emerge; they simply characterize 
different variants. Aristotle’s typology marked the beginning of a millennium-long research 
tradition on political systems, offering more sophisticated and theoretically informed 
typologies. A famous example is Arend Lijphart’s (1968) typology of democratic systems, 
developing the “polity” and “democracy” cells from Aristotle into an explanatory typology 
(Table 2): 
TABLE 2 
LIJPHART’S TYPOLOGY OF DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS 
 Political culture 
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In practice, an explanatory typology is a theory presented in a matrix in which the 
logically possible value combinations of the independent variables determine the possible 
outcomes on the dependent variable. The idea is that schematically presenting a theory will 
spur theory development in two ways: first, by encouraging thinking about all possible 
combinations of independent variables, the outcomes they produce, and the mechanisms 
linking independent variables with outcomes; and second, by identifying theoretically 
interesting causal relationships that can be tested empirically through cross-case 
comparisons and within-case analysis (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 254). 
The fifth criterion – consider a simpler solution with mutually exclusive types – is 
inspired by the principle known as Ockham’s razor. This principle is to select the hypothesis 
with the fewest assumptions, and proceed to simpler theories as long as explanatory power is 
not compromised. The principle is clearly relevant for explanatory typologies aiming to 
develop theory. On this note, a key debate in the typology literature concerns how to reduce 
the number of cells, also known as “the property space” (Elman, 2005; George & Bennett, 
2005, pp. 249–251). 
The property space is created by cross-tabulating all variables in a typology – a 
useful mapping exercise for exploring causal relationships, or, in the case of descriptive 
typologies, for identifying essential distinguishing characteristics. Cross-tabulated typologies 
also ensure mutually exclusive types as long as all cases can be meaningfully scored on the 
selected variables, that is, no case can assume more than one score or value on any of the 
relevant variables.  
The combined number of values on the descriptive/explanatory variables 
determines the size of the property space which grows exponentially and easily becomes 
unmanageable. Cells can thus be reduced by eliminating nonessential variables, by limiting 
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variables with identical scores, or by eliminating cells that are logically impossible.9 The 
theoretical relevance of a variable should ultimately decide whether to keep it or eliminate 
it. 
Finally, some literature stresses that explanatory typologies are more relevant for 
theory development (Doty & Glick, 1994; George & Bennett, 2005). A general advice is 
therefore to choose, whenever possible, explanatory typologies over descriptive ones. 
However, scholars are rarely free to make this choice because explanatory typologies require 
pre-existing theory (Elman, 2005, p. 296). Proponents of explanatory typologies may thus 
have overstated these typologies’ theoretical relevance at the expense of descriptive 
typologies. Descriptive typologies can also be relevant for theory development, although 
they are not premised on pre-existing causal theory (Collier et al., 2012, pp. 227–228). 
They encourage empirical precision and deep thinking about how and why types differ, and 
thus ultimately about types’ underlying causes – the question explanatory typologies seek to 
answer (Elman, 2005, pp. 296–298). Descriptive typologies can therefore be seen as a 
logical and sometimes necessary prelude to explanatory typologies when relevant theory is 
lacking.  
Having completed this general but necessary section on typology building, I now 
turn to Sprinzak’s typology of right-wing terrorism to see how it complies with the criteria 
outlined above. First, however, it is necessary to summarize his theory. 
 
The Theory of Split Delegitimization 
Sprinzak’s theory of right-wing terrorism arises from his work on what he called “the 
process of delegitimization” (Sprinzak, 1991). The essence of this process is a slowly 
evolving crisis of legitimacy between an insurgent group and the government. Terrorism is 
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the peak of this process, which has three stages: (1) a crisis of confidence, (2) a conflict of 
legitimacy, and (3) a crisis of legitimacy.  
Sprinzak seeks to explain how members of political protest groups can transform into 
brutal and indiscriminate killers. He describes how an initial crisis of confidence between 
protesters and the government, through confrontations with the police, can escalate into a 
conflict wherein protesters question the regime’s very legitimacy. At this point, the 
“psychodynamics” of small and isolated protest groups, including a “dehumanization of 
anyone associated with the regime,” leads to a state of crisis wherein protesters can 
“disengage morally and commit atrocities without remorse”(Sprinzak, 1995, pp. 18–20). 
Sprinzak uses this delegitimization process as a baseline for developing a theory of 
right-wing terrorism. To differentiate right-wing terrorists from other terrorists, Sprinzak 
distinguishes between “universalistic” terrorist organizations in direct conflict with the 
ruling government, and “particularistic” (right-wing) terrorist organizations fighting “private 
wars” against non-ruling groups (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 17).  
A “split” occurs when at some point violence is also directed towards the 
government. This split ensues when a rightist group feels that the government is not 
protecting them from a perceived threat. In this case, Sprinzak envisages “an intense 
delegitimization vis-à-vis the unaccepted non-ruling target group and a diluted 
delegitimization towards the regime” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 20). Hence, “the issue at stake is 
one of split delegitimization, namely, a case where an uneven radicalization of a group of 
extremists develops against two separate units” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 20, italics in original). 
 
Reviewing Sprinzak’s Typology 
Having introduced this theory, Sprinzak presents six right-wing terrorist types 
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the identification of the dominant principle around which a rightist group is organized and 
on its relation to the dynamics of split delegitimization” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 23, italics in 
original). In the following section, I discuss how this typology corresponds to the five criteria 
introduced above. 
 
1. Define the Overarching Concept  
Sprinzak offers characteristics of right-wing terrorist groups, but no explicit 
definition. He claims the split delegitimization theory identifies “the distinctive features of 
right-wing terrorism” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 17). The split delegitimization theory emphasizes 
target selection as the distinctive feature of right-wing terrorists claiming that they target 
non-ruling groups before the government. However, this claim is incorrect for a number of 
important cases. Some of Western Europe’s best known right-wing terrorist groups, such as 
l’Organisation de l’Armée Sécrete and Nuclei Armati Rivolutzionario directed their terrorist 
campaigns against the government either directly or indirectly (by attacking civilians). In 
particular, they did not consider immigrants or other minorities as their primary targets. A 
more recent example is Anders Behring Breivik, who bombed the Norwegian government 
quarters (eight persons killed) before murdering 69 members of the then-governing 
Norwegian Labour Party’s youth wing. 
The type of target may indicate who is behind a terrorist attack, but it can be a 
deceptive indicator. For example, Italian neo-Fascists conducted several attacks disguised as 
left-wing terrorism (Ferraresi, 1996). Similarly, the 1980 bomb attack on the Jewish 
synagogue on Rue Copernic in Paris, in the midst of a series of right-wing terrorist attacks in 
France, was the work of Middle Eastern terrorists (Hoffman, 1982; Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). 
Yet several analysts, including Sprinzak, continued portraying it as right-wing terrorism 
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A second distinctive feature identified by Sprinzak is how right-wing terrorists come 
to choose violence as a means for political struggle. According to Sprinzak, violence and 
terrorism emerge only gradually when the group involved feels increasingly insecure or 
threatened (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 21). This radicalization pattern may well apply, but is not 
limited to right-wing terrorist groups. Many other terrorist attacks result from growing 
anxiety towards perceived threats, normally from a superior enemy.10 Violent responses to 
perceived threats are hardly unique to right-wing terrorists, and therefore not a useful 
distinguishing feature.  
Finally, a third feature identified by Sprinzak concerns how right-wing terrorists feel 
about using violence. According to Sprinzak, right-wing terrorists “do not feel remorse about 
their violence and the atrocities they cause,” and there is “no need to undergo a profound 
psycho-political transformation to become brutal killers” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 22). However, 
no evidence is offered to support this claim; hence, the characteristic appears rather 
speculative. 
 
2. Specify Whether the Typology is Descriptive or Explanatory 
Is Sprinzak’s typology descriptive or explanatory? According to Sprinzak, the 
purpose is to organize data and compare cases, indicating a descriptive typology (Sprinzak, 
1995, pp. 18, 22). At the same time, the typology is indeed based on an explicit theory of 
why and under what conditions right-wing groups resort to terrorism, indicating an 
explanatory typology. The problem is that the theory does not specify its explanatory 
variables. One possible interpretation, however, is that it has two explanatory variables: (1) 
perceived threats from non-ruling groups, and (2) government protection from perceived 
                                                 
10
 The asymmetric relationship between terrorists and their enemies is highlighted by several terrorism scholars as one 




Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence 




ISSN: 2363-9849         
threats. If this interpretation is correct, the theory predicts that right-wing groups who feel 
sufficiently threatened will resort to terrorism, first against non-ruling groups, then against 
the government if protection is lacking. If we dichotomize these explanatory variables, the 
theory can be presented in a 2x2 matrix as an explanatory typology (Table 3). 
TABLE 3 
EXPLANATORY TYPOLOGY BASED ON THE SPLIT 
DELEGITIMIZATION THEORY 
 











This typology contains only two logical types, single- and double-targeting terrorism. 
How, then, did Sprinzak end up with six types? It appears that the dynamics of split 
delegitimization played only a secondary role in constructing the typology, while the main 
constitutive variable was “the dominant principle around which the rightist group is 
organized” (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 23 italics in original). Thus, the typology is not explanatory 
because this variable is not based on a theory. Rather, it is a descriptive variable identifying 
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3. Describe How the Types Are Constructed 
Sprinzak does not elaborate on how this dominant organizing principle has been 
identified and operationalized. Instead, he systematically discusses the presence or absence 
of the dynamics of split delegitimization for each type. This discussion reveals that these 
dynamics are only partially present in most types and completely absent in others (Sprinzak, 
1995, pp. 35–37). While Sprinzak could present these findings as an example of theory 
falsification, he does not acknowledge the apparent lack of consistency between his theory 
and his typology. Thus, the theory is not rejected, despite the conflicting anecdotal evidence 
introduced by the author himself.  
 
4. Propose a Model or Matrix 
Sprinzak offers no model or matrix of his typology. Note, however, that Table 3 
illustrates one way of presenting the split delegitimization theory in a 2x2 matrix.  
 
5. Consider a Simpler Solution with Mutually Exclusive Types 
Sprinzak has offered the only universal typology of right-wing terrorism to date. This 
is praiseworthy; however, the typology’s broad scope can also be seen as a weakness. By 
covering the entire world, Sprinzak is forced to include very different actors under the same 
label. He also lacks systematic data for such a large empirical universe. The typology 
therefore appears to have been built using anecdotal evidence rather than by systematically 
employing theoretical or empirical variables.  
Furthermore, Sprinzak’s types are not mutually exclusive. Although Sprinzak 
recognizes the problem, he does not try to solve it (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 22). A major weakness 
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Finally, it remains unclear exactly how the typology was created. Rather than 
extending and patching Sprinzak’s typology, I therefore propose to develop a new typology 
of right-wing terrorism. 
 
A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe  
I now apply the five criteria introduced earlier to develop a new typology of right-
wing terrorism in Western Europe. Note that the emphasis on Western Europe is not 
intended to challenge the notion of a strong transatlantic relationship between the radical 
right in Europe and that in North America – a relationship that is well documented by the 
existing literature (Jackson & Shekhovtsov, 2014; Kaplan & Bjørgo, 1998; Kaplan & 
Weinberg, 1998). Western Europe was chosen because the region lacks an adequate 
categorization of key actors and key events.  
 
1. Define the Overarching Concept  
The literature on right-wing extremism is a logical starting point for conceptualizing 
right-wing terrorism. However, the literature offers no unified definition of right-wing 
extremism. The problem arises from the existence of two distinct approaches to studying 
political extremism. The first approach relates extremism to political opinion: If your 
political opinions diverge dramatically from the majority opinion, you are an extremist.11 
The second approach relates extremism to the means activists use in pursuing their political 
goals: If you support illegal violence, you are an extremist, regardless of your specific 
political opinions.12 While these descriptions admittedly exaggerate each approach, they 
                                                 
11
 For an overview of 26 opinion-based definitions of right-wing extremism, see Mudde (1995). 
12
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serve to illustrate why existing scholarship on right-wing extremism remains ambiguous 
concerning precisely what and who the objects of study are. 
For the purpose of this article, right-wing extremism is understood as the support of 
using illegal violence to promote right-wing policies. What are right-wing policies? The 
left/right dichotomy originated during the French Revolution.13 Since then, it has been 
given many new meanings. At its core, however, remains a fundamental divide between 
those on the left who support policies designed to reduce social inequality, and those on the 
right who regard social inequality as inevitable, natural, or desirable (Bobbio & Cameron, 
1996). Right-wing extremists thus accept use of illegal violence to promote social inequality. 
The exact nature of such policies and the criteria used to make corresponding social 
hierarchies, or rules of segregation, are subject to change across time and space.  
The majority of right-wing extremists are not physically involved in violence. 
Posting extremist messages online (i.e. encouraging violence) involves less risk than 
participating in violent street activism or even terrorism. Two additional distinctions are 
therefore helpful: between extremists and militants, and between militants and terrorists. A 
militant physically demonstrates a willingness to use violence to pursue political goals.14 A 
terrorist uses or threatens violence strategically to affect and audience beyond the 
immediate target (Hoffman, 2006, p. 40). I shall not delve further into the terrorism 
definition debate. Although terrorism remains a contested concept, terrorism scholars 
broadly agree about its main features (Schmid, 2011). Right-wing terrorists are therefore 
defined as non-state actors who strategically use or threaten violence to affect an audience 
beyond the immediate target to promote social inequality.  
                                                 
13
 The French king’s supporters sat to the right of the National Assembly’s president and the revolution’s supporters sat 
to his left.  
14
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines militancy as “favouring confrontational or violent methods in support of a 




Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence 




ISSN: 2363-9849         
2. Specify Whether the Typology is Descriptive or Explanatory 
Because specific theories of right-wing terrorism are in short supply, notwithstanding 
Sprinzak’s split delegitimization theory, a descriptive typology is proposed.15 The typology 
aims to describe and categorize the most salient right-wing terrorist actors and violent 
perpetrators in Western Europe after WWII. Furthermore, by identifying and highlighting 
essential differences between key actors, the typology is also intended to generate thinking 
about the different socio-political conditions from which these actors emerged. As such, the 
typology may contribute to future theory development and perhaps also to future 
explanatory typologies.  
 
3. Describe How the Types Are Constructed 
I begin by examining available records of right-wing terrorist attacks in Western 
Europe post–WWII. The latest edition of Routledge’s Handbook of Terrorism Research 
reviews the world’s top 20 terrorism databases (Bowie & Schmid, 2011). Only four 
databases allow isolating right-wing attacks in Western Europe from other attacks. Two 
recently became unavailable (WITS and MIPT), thereby leaving us with The Terrorism in 
Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) and Europol’s annual EU Terrorism Situation 
and Trend Report (TE-SAT).16  
                                                 
15
 This lack of theories is emphasized by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2003, 2005) in his two reviews of the literature on right-
wing terrorism and violence respectively. Note, however, that the social movement literature has recently produced 
several fruitful studies of right-wing militancy and terrorism in Western Europe (key examples include Albanese & 
Froio, 2014; Caiani, Porta, & Wagemann, 2012; Della Porta, 2013). 
16
 The TWEED dataset is available at http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm. TE-SAT is available at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37. A third relevant source not included in this review is the 
Domestic Terrorist Victims (DTV) dataset available at www.march.es/dtv. Matching DTV data against TWEED data 
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Coincidentally, the periods covered by these two databases link up. TWEED covers 
1950–2004, while TE-SAT covers 2004–2013, although systematically only from 2006 
onwards. Combined data from these two databases thus indicate general trends of right-
wing terrorism 1950–2013, despite different registration methods.17 TWEED registered 
648 right-wing terrorist attacks 1950–2004 (approximately 6% of a total of 10,239 attacks). 
TE-SAT registered nine right-wing terrorist attacks 2006–2013, but only two in Western 
Europe. The remaining quantitative analysis is therefore based on TWEED data only.18  
TWEED displays three waves of attacks: France in the early 1960s, Italy in the 
1970s, and Germany in the early 1990s. France, Italy, and Germany also dominate the 
aggregate country share of casualties. Figure 1 and Table 4 illustrate attack frequencies and 
casualties. What do these patterns tell us? 
                                                 
17
 TE-SAT is based on annual reporting from EU member states. TWEED is entirely based on Keesing’s Record of 
World Events, available at http://library.princeton.edu/resource/3894.  
18
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FIGURE 1 
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TABLE 4 
CASUALTIES OF RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN WESTERN 
EUROPE 1950–2004 
Country Killed (Wounded) Attacks Intensity 
Italy 162 (772) 89 10,5 
France 89 (303) 262 1,5 
(West) Germany 51 (267) 133 2,4 
Spain 15 (56) 36 2,0 
Belgium 7 (3) 12 0,8 
Portugal 5 (4) 11 0,8 
Austria 4 (4) 14 0,6 
Switzerland 3 (5) 9 0,9 
United Kingdom 2 (115) 10 11,7 
Greece 1 (81) 65 1,3 
Norway 1 (0) 2 0,5 
Sweden 0 (4) 3 1,3 
Denmark 0 (0) 1 0,0 
Netherlands 0 (0) 1 0,0 
Finland - - - 
Iceland - - - 
Luxemburg - - - 
Ireland - - - 
Sum 340 (1614) 648  
Note: Intensity is the sum of killed and wounded divided by number of attacks. 
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Individual data for France, Italy, and Germany reveal a striking picture: only four 
terrorist groups were behind as much as 39% of the 648 right-wing attacks registered in 
TWEED, and 56% of all killings: l’Organisation de l’Armeé Secrete (OAS) in France, 
Ordine Nero (ON) and Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR) in Italy, and Wehrsportgruppe 
Hoffmann (WSH) in Germany.  
While only four groups conducted a significant share of the attacks, a much larger 
number of mostly unknown groups conducted the rest. Excluding one outlier, 65% of these 
attacks have unknown perpetrators.19 Nearly half of these 65% happened in Germany 
1991–1992, while the remaining half is distributed evenly across time and space, except for 
two smaller peaks in Italy in the 1970s.  
As many as 42 known groups were behind the remaining 35% of the attacks – also 
distributed evenly across time and space. Of those 42 groups, only four conducted more 
than five attacks, and no one group conducted more than ten attacks. The majority of the 
known groups conducted only one or two attacks.  
These numbers suggest that right-wing terrorists in Western Europe can be divided 
into two categories or types: one consisting of a handful of known groups responsible for a 
substantial number of attacks and killings, and one consisting of 42 known and even more 
unknown groups involved in only a few attacks, typically one or two. These initial patterns 
form the basis of the typology proposed below. 
Next, by investigating specific cases from each category, additional type 
characteristics emerge. Such case studies may help identify new variables that can be used 
to compare and contrast the corresponding types. In addition, new types may appear that do 
not fit the original categories. For example, lone actors represent a potential third category or 
                                                 
19
 On 17 December 1978, the Greek group Organismus Etnikis Anorthosoos claimed responsibility for 40 attacks (zero 
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type. Thus, based on a broad investigation of relevant cases, the following three tentative 
types are proposed and described below: elite-sponsored groups, subcultural networks, and 
lone actors.  
 
Elite-sponsored groups. Elite-sponsored terrorists operated predominantly in France, 
Italy, Spain, and Germany between the 1960s and the 1980s. These groups had up to 
several hundred militants and were organized hierarchically with a centralized leadership. 
Their terrorist campaigns were motivated by international conflicts rather than by 
immigration, which had yet to become a contested issue in Western Europe. More 
specifically, their campaigns were products of elite-sponsored strategies meant to protect or 
reinstall former authoritarian regimes, and to obstruct their leftist enemies from gaining 
political power. The OAS, ON, NAR, and WSH are among the most important cases. 
OAS is behind the largest number of right-wing terrorist attacks in history. TWEED 
covers attacks in France, but not in Algeria, where OAS was most active. From 1961–1962, 
OAS conducted 221 attacks in France, killing 63 persons and wounding 191. Former high-
ranking French officers and a handful of civilians created OAS in February 1960. They 
wanted to protect the large, white, and privileged pied noir community then living in 
Algeria. Their strategic aims were therefore to prevent France from granting Algeria 
independence, and to defeat the socialist revolutionaries from the Algerian Front de 
Libération Nationale. OAS soon developed into an advanced terrorist organization, 
benefiting from its founding officers’ military experience. At its peak, OAS counted about 
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(Harrison, 1989). These units conducted terrorist campaigns on two continents 
simultaneously including several assassination attempts on President Charles de Gaulle.20 
The Black Orchestra refers to a shadowy Italian network assumed to be behind one 
of history’s most extensive right-wing terrorist campaigns (Laurent & Sutton, 1978). Waves 
of left- and right-wing violence hit Italy between the late 1960s and the early 1980s. Among 
a multitude of militant factions, four right-wing groups stand out as key protagonists of this 
violent drama: Ordine Nuevo, Avanguardia Nazionale, Ordine Nero, and Nuclei Armati 
Rivoluzionari. These groups are assumed to be behind some of Italy’s most devastating 
terrorist attacks, including the following bombings: Piazza Fontana in Rome (1969), Peteano 
(1972), the Italicus train (1974), Piazza della Loggia in Brescia (1974), and the Bologna train 
station (1980). These attacks were part of an elite-driven strategy known as “the strategy of 
tension” (Cento Bull, 2007). The strategic aim, understandable only in a Cold War context, 
was preventing Communism’s influence in Italy and beyond. Those implementing it, 
mainly members of Italy’s secret service and police, used right-wing militants to conduct 
terrorist attacks masked as left-wing terrorism to weaken popular support for Italy’s 
Communist Party (Ferraresi, 1996). 
Two of the deadliest attacks in the history of right-wing terrorism happened in 1980: 
the Bologna train station attack (85 killed and over 200 wounded), and the Munich 
Oktoberfest bombing (thirteen killed and 213 wounded).  The latter has by several accounts 
(including TWEED) been attributed to the German militia Wehsportgruppe Hoffmann 
(WSH), although this group was never convicted. Recent evidence, however, strengthens 
the alleged connection between WSH and the Oktoberfest attack (Paterson, 2015). WSH’s 
strategic aim was overthrowing West Germany’s socialist government and installing a new 
                                                 
20
 Alexander Harrison (1989) has written the most authoritative account of the OAS. Other relevant accounts include 
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authoritarian regime (Fromm, 1998). They drew inspiration from the paramilitary assault 
division of the German Nazi Party –Sturmabteilung (SA) – that was influential in Hitler’s 
rise to power. WSH had at least six divisions across Germany, totalling about 400 members 
(Fromm, 1998). These divisions had access to substantial military resources and the group 
emulated a professional military organization with uniforms, ranks, and insignia. WSH 
members were also involved in international terrorism, reportedly collaborating with the 
Lebanese Phalange and with the PLO (Hoffman, 1982; Schmidt, 1993). 
 
Subcultural networks. While elite-sponsored groups diminished in the 1980s, right-
wing subcultural networks flourished in the 1980s and 1990s (Bjørgo, 1997; Bjørgo & 
Witte, 1993; Merkl & Weinberg, 1997). One contributing factor to this new wave of right-
wing activism was the large influx of non-western immigrants that Western Europe 
experienced during the late 1980s and 1990s, in combination with an emerging and 
increasingly violent skinhead subculture.21   
In contrast to elite-sponsored groups, subcultural networks have little support 
beyond their own underground movement. They may express general antipathy towards 
immigrants, political enemies, and the government through symbols and propaganda, but 
rarely present concrete political demands. Sometimes, an attack’s primary aim may simply 
be to gain respect and influence within a group or social network. Subcultural networks are 
largely nationally oriented and only rarely involved in international terrorism. While 
concerned about immigration, they are also motivated by their endless street war with leftist 
militants.22  
                                                 
21
 Perhaps the best account of the emergence of the European skinhead subculture is found in the introduction of John 
Hamm’s (1993) pioneering study of American skinheads. 
22
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Existing literature suggest that violence by subcultural networks has been distributed 
over at least two generations: The first generation was behind a wave of attacks (primarily 
targeting immigrants) in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Koopmans, 1996). Most attacks 
were conducted by unorganized racist youth mobs, skinhead gangs, and hooligans with 
limited ideological motivation, and no overarching strategy (Bjørgo & Witte, 1993).  
The second generation emerged in the mid-1990s and consisted of smaller 
autonomous groups that were better organized and more ideologically motivated. These 
groups typically had no leadership beyond their own cell structure, but were connected 
through a loosely organized network of similar groups, sometimes referred to as a 
groupuscular network (Griffin, 2003; Jackson, 2014; Virchow, 2004). Compared to the first 
generation, they conducted fewer but more targeted attacks, not only against immigrants, 
but also against left-wing and government targets.23 Many such groups were inspired by the 
strategic principle of leaderless resistance, introduced by the American white supremacist 
Louis Beam (1992). Their strategic aim was to incite a revolutionary war between races.  
 
Lone actors. Finally, lone-actor terrorism consists of attacks or plots that nobody 
except the individual perpetrator is aware of. While lone actors carry out their operational 
planning in isolation, they are generally seen as strongly influenced by existing political 
movements, typically through online activities (Kaplan, Lööw, & Malkki, 2014). Recent 
research also suggests that while most terrorists are normal, psychologically speaking, a 
significant share of lone actors suffer from mental disorders (Corner & Gill, 2014).  
One study, which analysed 198 lone actor attacks, found that right-wing actors 
constituted the second largest category (17%), next to attacks in which the perpetrator’s 
ideological conviction remains unknown (Spaaij, 2012). A similar study of 119 lone actors 
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found that 34% were right-wingers (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014). In short, lone actor 
terrorism is not exclusively a right-wing phenomenon, but right-wing motivations are 
overrepresented compared to other political ideologies.  
4. Propose a Model or Matrix 
Having described some key characteristics of and differences between these three 
tentative types, we may now illustrate them using a model or a matrix. Table 5 offers an 
initial overview of eight descriptive variables (all of which were used in the above discussion 
to compare and contrast the three tentative types).  
TABLE 5 













Leadership Centralized Decentralized N/A 
Group membership Large (>100) Small (<50) N/A 
Known political 
strategy 
Always Sometimes Sometimes 
Affiliation to former 
right-wing regime 
Yes No No 
Sponsorship Elites  Subculture None 
Significant access to 
military resources 
Yes No No 
International 
terrorism 





Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence 




ISSN: 2363-9849         
 
Not yet cross-tabulated, these variables are meant to help illustrate key differences 
between three ideal types as an intermediary step towards a more rigorous categorization. 
This means that deviations may and will occur. For example, most terrorist attacks from 
subcultural groups and lone actors occur within a national context. However, there are 
exceptions to this rule, such as when a Danish affiliate of the UK-based group Combat 18 in 
1997 attempted to send letter-bombs from Sweden to UK addresses, or, when the Austrian-
based lone actor Franz Fuchs targeted people in Germany, also with letter bombs.   
 
5. Consider a Simpler Solution with Mutually Exclusive Types 
As already explained, cross-tabulating variables ensures mutually exclusive types 
and encourages simple solutions because the number of variables and/or values must be 
limited to achieve a manageable property space. If all eight variables in Table 5 were to be 
cross-tabulated, we would end up with 28=256 cells (assuming only dichotomous cells) and 
253 potentially new types in addition to the initial three. Clearly, cell reduction is needed to 
create a simpler typology.  
One technique for reducing cells is merging similar variables. The variables 
“organizational structure,” “leadership,” and “group membership” can for example be 
merged into the variable “organization” with three values: “strong,” “loose,” and “absent.” 
Another cell reduction technique is to merge or eliminate variables with identical scores on 
several types. Most of the dichotomous variables in Table 5 can be eliminated because they 
score identically on subcultural networks and lone actors and are therefore not helpful for 
distinguishing between them.  
The theoretically most relevant variables should be kept. Terrorism is always part of 
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strategic aim is lacking, or is not political, we are likely not dealing with terrorists. As shown 
by the preceding discussion, violent attacks from subcultural networks and lone actors are 
not always motivated by specific political strategies. It may therefore be useful to apply a 
dichotomous “strategy” variable to distinguish thugs from terrorists, although the former 
may also have a terrorizing effect on their victims.   
Cross-tabulating these two variables (organization and strategy) results in a 3x2 
matrix (Table 6). We may then consider whether all types are logically possible, whether 
they can be populated with relevant cases, and try to find an appropriate label for each type. 
TABLE 6 
TYPOLOGY FRAMEWORK 
 Political strategy 
Organization Yes No 
Strong A D 
Loose B E 
Absent C F 
 
Elite-sponsored groups (cell A), such as the OAS and NAR, are strongly organised 
groups, aiming to conserve or reinstall authoritarian regimes and to undermine their leftist 
enemies. These groups gradually disappeared from Western Europe as the Cold War came 
to an end and the legacies of former authoritarian regimes evaporated. Note, however, that 
large hierarchic militant groups have been active in Western Europe also after the end of 
the Cold War. Examples include the German Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz – a group 
consisting of up to 140 members that was banned in 2001, or, the still active Swedish group 
Svenska Motståndsrörelsen with well beyond 100 active members in several divisions in 
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of being involved in large-scale terrorist campaigns. One reason may be that they lack 
significant elite support – a decisive factor for facilitating and justifying the terrorist 
campaigns of their predecessors. Indeed, these groups have more in common with more 
loosely organized subcultural networks.  
As described earlier, violence by subcultural networks has been distributed over at 
least two waves of attacks. The first was attributed to racist mobs, gangs, and hooligans (cell 
E) with limited ideological motivation and no overarching strategy. Although terrorizing 
their victims, such attacks do not necessarily qualify as terrorism because their strategic aim 
is unclear. The second wave consisted of more targeted attacks intended to incite 
revolutionary war. The perpetrators organized in small autonomous groups or cells (cell B) 
inspired by the strategic principle of leaderless resistance. The German NSU-cell provides 
an example (Köhler, 2014b).  
Some lone actors, such as Anders Behring Breivik and David Copeland, expressed 
their strategic aims clearly through political manifestos or in court. Both were lone actors 
(cell C), Copeland aiming to incite a war between races, Breivik aiming to incite a war 
between cultures. Other violent loners (cell F) fail to express their aims clearly, either 
because they act spontaneously or because they have no clear strategy. Labelling such 
perpetrators as terrorists would be misleading.  
Finally, some groups appear equally or more interested in making money than in 
politics. For example, in 2005, 18 members of a Spanish neo-Nazi network were arrested 
for storing and selling weapons, including dozens of shotguns and a grenade launcher, and 
for advocating violence through their website (El Temps, 2008). Yet their activities 
apparently did not involve the planning of terrorist attacks. In 2009, UK police rounded up 
a global arms ring supplying white supremacists worldwide with firearms and explosives 
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Such criminal groups may however act as supporters of more politically oriented 
clandestine groups. For example, the Austrian group “Object 21” which controlled large 
parts of the red light scene at the German-Austrian border, used money and explosives 
acquired though criminal activity to support other and more politically oriented groups in 
Germany and Austria (The Vienna Review, 2013).  
Summing up the discussion in the last few paragraphs, Table 7 presents a simplified 
(fewer variables) yet more nuanced (more types) version of the typology introduced in 
Table 5. The typology includes an additional dimension categorizing perpetrators into two 
overarching types of violence: terrorism and criminal violence. This dimension is included 
to illustrate the inherent ambiguity of right-wing terrorism as a concept, and its close relation 
to other forms of violence, such as hate crimes (see Deloughery, King, & Asal, 2012).  
TABLE 7 
TYPOLOGY OF RIGHT-WING TERRORISM AND 
VIOLENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE 
 Political strategy 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to systematically categorize Western Europe’s most 
important right-wing terrorists and violent perpetrators after WWII. As such, the proposed 
typology should only be seen as an initial step towards more explanatory oriented studies of 
past and present actors. Its strengths lie in its simplicity and in the fact that its types are 
derived from a combination of empirical patterns (TWEED attack frequencies), case 
studies, and the typological criteria introduced earlier.   
 While the proposed typology offers only limited insight into the causal mechanisms 
underlying its proposed types, certain aspects could be interesting to pursue further in 
future studies. For example, the interplay between international conflicts, regime types, and 
elite behaviour could be key for understanding the rise and fall of large-scale right-wing 
terrorist campaigns. Consequently, given Western Europe’s current political situation, the 
threat from strongly organized right-wing groups appears to be significantly lower today 
than some 20 to 30 years ago. The reason is that the majority of attacks and killings were 
conducted by a type of elite-sponsored groups that are less likely to operate in contemporary 
Western Europe. As long as the legacies of former authoritarian regimes continue to 
evaporate, and democracies consolidate, Western Europe provides less fertile ground for 
such large and well-organised terrorist groups.  
At the same time, we lack reliable and updated data on more loosely organized forms 
of right-wing terrorism and violence. This type of violence tends to fall beneath the 
government radar, and is often reported as hate crime rather than terrorism. The low 
number of right-wing incidents reported by Europol’s annual terrorism report is an indicator 
of this problem. There is therefore a critical need for more empirical research to document 
recent developments. A commendable contribution in this regard is Daniel Köhler’s (2014a) 
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In terms of future theory development, the proposed typology also suggests that 
right-wing terrorism should not be treated as a monolithic phenomenon, and that different 
actor types must be studied independently. A logical next step would therefore be to 
develop more actor-specific theories, possibly by use of explanatory typologies. Such actor-
specific theories may in fact prove more universally valid than any universal theory or 
typology of right-wing terrorism. For example, rightist lone actors may not be so different 
from leftist or jihadist lone actors. Some of the proposed types may thus apply also outside 
the right-wing extremist domain. The proposed typology could therefore potentially prove 
useful for analysing other forms of terrorism and political violence, considering the universal 
nature of its constitutive variables, strategy and organization.  
Although the proposed typology is descriptive rather than explanatory, it can be used 
as a springboard for further explanatory analysis. Rather than contrasting descriptive and 
explanatory typologies, we should ask how they relate, and how we can move from 
description towards explanation when relevant theory is lacking. This question has so far 
not been adequately addressed by the social science scholarship on typologies. A more 
nuanced understanding would certainly boost the theoretical utility of many typologies, 
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